July 2010

To Earmark or Not to Earmark
Holley Hewitt Ulbrich
Senior Scholar
Strom Thurmond Institute
Earmarked revenues are dedicated to a particular use and are not available for general spending
purposes. Earmarked revenues are a common practice among states. There are three arguments for
earmarking, and two against this practice.
The first argument is that there is an element of quid pro quo, or a market-like exchange. Some taxes,
are earmarked on the basis of who benefits from the service it supports—the gasoline tax for highway
construction and maintenance being the most obvious case. Many fees and charges are payments for
service, much like private sales, such as water and sewer service and use of recreational facilities. Good
accounting practice suggests that these enterprise activities should segregate their revenue and
spending streams from the general public budget.
Second, there is an fairness argument for earmarking. Many fees are designed to ensure that the cost of
additional service, or services to particular groups or areas, falls on those who demanded that service,
rather than on taxpayers in general. Impact fees in particular are a way to share the cost of public
capital among newcomers to the community, rather than imposing additional tax burdens on existing
taxpayers.
Finally, the third and most important argument is political; earmarking may make a tax or fee more
acceptable if people know it will all be spent on some desirable purpose. For example, states that have
adopted lotteries almost always have had to have a referendum, because most states had anti-lottery
provisions in their constitutions. To make a lottery more attractive, legislators promised to use the
revenue for specific desirable purposes, such as education, economic development, local government, or
senior citizen programs. If citizens have to vote on any kind of tax or revenue increase, earmarking
increases the chances for approval.
Most economists support limited earmarking such as with fees for service or a clear benefit relationship
between the revenue source and the object of the earmarking. However, earmarking usually extends
far beyond the fee for service or benefit to ensure preferential treatment for certain groups or
programs in the budget process. Sometimes schools or local governments are guaranteed the proceeds
of a particular revenue source regardless of the competing demands on the state budget. Other times
supporters of parks, or highways, or some service with a vocal and effective lobbying group within or
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outside of government that succeeds in obtaining an earmarked revenue source. When earmarking is
not clearly justified in terms of some kind of “user pays” principle, then it needs to be reexamined.
The arguments against earmarking are powerful because they are grounded in fundamental economic
principles about choices and tradeoffs. When revenues are earmarked, they are removed from that
process of weighing one expenditure against another that lies at the heart of good budget practice.
The amount of revenue going to a particular purpose, such as gasoline taxes for highways, may be too
much or too little relative to how much would be spent if highways were funded through the general
budgetary process. If it is too much, the surplus is not available for other uses. If it is too little, that
spending category may find it difficult to compete for additional funding out of general revenue because
it already has preferential access to its “own” funds. For example, lottery funding for education has
made it more difficult in some states for public education to get increased funds from general revenue
sources, even though most state lotteries generate only a modest portion of the funding needed to
provide for public education. At the other end of the spectrum, tourism destination states have been
involved in a costly and escalating advertising war simply because state tourism departments had
preferential access to dedicated revenues from accommodations and admissions taxes.
Finally, earmarking can make a budget crunch even worse when the economy turns down. It is easy to
earmark specific revenue sources for pet programs when revenue is rising and competition for public
resources is not too severe. But with a revenue downturn, legislators may find that a big part of their
revenue stream has been taken off budget and placed in special funds. That practice means that
preferred projects cannot be cut because their revenues are protected. The burden of budget cuts
then falls much harder on those public programs and services that do not have access to earmarked
revenues. In the next budget upswing, there will be increased pressure to earmark revenue for some of
these programs and services that suffered during the previous recession, further limiting the flexibility in
making adjustments in future budgets.
In spite of its political popularity, most economists advise against earmarking as a general principle,
although with some exceptions. The burden of proof is on those who are trying to make a case for
earmarking. Most of the revenue needs to be available to the general fund so that legislators have the
freedom to make tradeoffs among spending priorities.
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